Appendix A Measuring Strength of National Identification
Because I developed a new measure of strength of nationalism, I also included the standard Afrobarometer question that measures national relative to ethnic identification on the study questionnaire. The Afrobarometer question asks "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [respondent's identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" with response categories being "I feel only [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.]," "I feel more [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] than (r's groups)," "I feel equally [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and (r's groups)," "I feel more (r's group) than [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.]," and "I feel only (r's group)." Figure A .1 shows that my composite measure of national identification and the Afrobarometer question are strongly related: the strongest average national identification by my measures is observed for those respondents who claimed to identify only with their national identity in response to the Afrobarometer question, and national identification strength decreases as the national identity becomes less preferred relative to the ethnic identity in the Afrobarometer question. For example, among respondents who answered the Afrobarometer question with "I feel only [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] ," the average strength of national identification using my novel composite measure is 0.10. This number decreases to 0.04 for those who said "I feel more [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] than (r's groups)," to 0.02 for those who said "I feel equally [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and (r's groups)," to -0.21 for those who said "I feel more (r's group) than [Ghanaian/ Kenyan/etc.] ," and to -0.26 for those who said "I feel only (r's group)." .
While this speaks to the validity of the measure, there are several reasons why the composite measure I developed is preferable to the standard question. First, my measure captures strength of national identification without anchoring to ethnic identification. The standard Afrobarometer question implicitly assumes that national and ethnic forms of group identification are antithetical, but research has shown that this is not necessarily the case (De la Garza et al., 1996; Sidanius et al., 1997) . As a result, the relative measure may not always o↵er a good indication of strength of nationalism: a respondent with both weak national and weak ethnic identification will look similar to a respondent with equally strong ethnic and national identification, even though the latter has much stronger national identification. Second, unlike the Afrobarometer question, the measure I developed gives concrete statements and asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees. Such binary response categories increase inter-respondent question validity. Third, my measure allows for the desegregation of national identification into di↵erent types. This makes it possible to evaluate whether di↵erent "types" of national identification have di↵erent impacts on interethnic trust. 
Appendix B Summary Statistics

Descriptive Statistics
The household survey data was collected for 508 Malawians (31-32 per village in 16 villages), and the survey and behavioral games were carried out for 428 of those 508 Malawians (206 Chewa and 222 Tumbuka). 28 465 (92%) of the 508 Malawians who were invited actually showed up for their assigned game session. Of those 465, data were not collected on 14 because they showed up late or enough participants had already shown up from their village, and 23 people were excluded from the dataset because their demographic information (age, gender, marital status, level of education) did not match across the two surveys, suggesting that the market study participant was not the same person as the individual originally interviewed. The 428 participants do not di↵er significantly from the 80 participants excluded as mismatches, no shows, and late shows in terms of composite or constituent measure of strength of national identification, or education level (Table B .1). However, excluded potential participants were, on average, more likely to be male and from the Chewa ethnic group and had weaker a↵ective nationalism. Table B .2 provides summary statistics for the 428 Malawian participants from whom we have all three sources of data. All four measures of national identification strength (composite, a↵ective, behavioral, and cognitive) have a mean near 0 and standard deviation near 1 because of standardization (slight deviations result from the fact that the measures were standardized for all interviewed participants (n = 508)). All measures are negatively skewed. Roughly half of all participants were exposed to the flag prime due to random 28 While not a main focus of the project, we also collected (as a by-product of the research design) trust game behavior for 341 Zambians (168 Chewa and 172 Tumbuka), although the Zambian participants were not selected randomly and a few Zambian villages were invited to send participants more than once. assignment. The average level of education is almost 6 years of schooling, 52% of participants were male, 48% of participants were Chewa ethnicity, 46% of game sessions were conducted at Chisinga Market, and the average frequency of market attendance was 1-2 times per week. Table B .3 reports summary statistics for all 1700 trust decisions made by the 428 participants. The average amount entrusted was 30 MWK, with 12%, 42%, 27%, and 19% entrusting 0 MWK, 20 MWK, 40 MWK, and 60 MWK, respectively. Decisions were evenly spread over the di↵erent game orderings, with 25% of decisions made first, second, third, or fourth. Table B .4 presents summary statistics by ethnic group for the composite measure of national identification, the three constituent measures of national identification, overall amount entrusted, and proportions of each amount entrusted. The only apparent di↵erence is that Tumbuka participants expressed stronger national identification than Chewa participants, but the di↵erence is only statistically significant for the aggregated measure of national identification. Stronger nationalism among the Tumbuka is somewhat surprising given the centrality of Chewa cultural traditions in Malawian national culture (Kaspin, 1995) . However, these patterns are consistent with existing public opinion data from Malawi (Afrobarometer, 2012) that shows only 33 percent of Chewa identify more nationally than ethnically, while 42 of Tumbuka do so. 
Experimental Balance
Consistent with random assignment to experimental treatment, there were no statistically significant di↵erences in observables between the control and treatment groups. 
Appendix C Trust Game Instructions
The following scripts were developed using the game scripts provided by Schechter (2007). I augmented the standard instructions by adding an explicit frame for understanding the game. In particular, during the general instructions to the entire group of participants, we framed the game as analogous to the decision about whether to sell one's surplus maize locally versus sending the maize with a virtual stranger to be sold in the capital for a much higher price (see below for the exact language used). The frame was included for three reasons. First, because of its abstract nature, the game can be di cult to understand. Focus group discussions during piloting suggested that the maize selling frame most closely resembled the logic of the trust game and made the instructions much easier for participants to understand. Second, the theoretical motivation for using the trust game to measure interpersonal trust at the micro-level is to help understand the impact of ethnic di↵erence on economic interactions under di↵erent levels of national identification. By framing the trust game as an economic transaction that most participants had engaged in, the trust game became both more familiar and more connected to the theoretical motivation of the project. Third, existing scholarship has shown that the way in which a game is understood vis-a-vis di↵erent cultural or economic frames a↵ects the way in which individuals behave within that game (Ensminger, 2000; Burnham et al., 2000; Cronk, 2007) . Thus, explicitly providing a frame reduces the likelihood that di↵erent individuals used di↵erent frames in making behavioral decisions.
The general instructions for the entire group were given first in Chichewa and then repeated in Chitumbuka. Individual instructions were given to participants in their native language.
Instructions to Entire Group
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today's activities may take three to four hours. Before we begin I want to make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we must follow. We will ask each of you a few questions about yourself and your opinions, and then we will be doing some activities with money. Whatever money you earn during the activities will be yours to keep and take home. We will be supplying the money. This money was given to us by Stanford University to use for research.
Today you will be participating in this activity with people from four di↵erent villages, one of them your own. Fifteen residents from four di↵erent villages are here today. [Research supervisor lists the four participating villages in alphabetical order This means that there are both Malawians and Zambians, and both Chewas and Tumbukas.
Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. Many of you were invited here without understanding very much about what we are planning to do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the activity or not.
We will be asking you to do an activity with other individuals in this room today. If you have heard anything about these types of activities, you should try to forget about that because each activity can be completely di↵erent. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the way the activity works will actually be able to participate.
We will run through some examples of how the activity works here while we are all together. You cannot ask questions or talk while here in the group. This is very important. Please be sure that you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the activity for everyone. If one person talks about the activity while sitting in the group, we would not be able to carry out the activity today. Do not worry if you do not completely understand the rules as we go through the examples here in the group. Each of you will have a chance to ask questions in private to be sure that you understand how the activity works.
After we have explained the activity, you will all go outside and wait while we call you in one at a time to participate. We will call you by the number on your ticket, so please listen carefully for your number. While you are outside you can talk about football, the market, or anything else you want other than the activities here today.
The activity we are going to do today is sort of like a game, but because you can earn money depending on the decisions you make, it is much more serious than a game just for fun. In fact, the activity is similar to real decisions you might make in your day to day life. For example, imagine that you want to sell a bag of maize. You know that a bag of maize is currently selling for 1500 MWK in this market (Chisinga/Chimaliro), but around 3000 MWK in Lilongwe (capital of Malawi). You've heard that someone is taking a load of maize down to Lilongwe for a small fee, but you do not know this person personally. If you decide to send your bag of maize to be sold by this stranger in Lilongwe, a number of things might happen. The trader may return the following week with your 3000 MWK, he may never bring you the money you are owed, or he may return some amount of money between 0 and 3000 MWK. So, if you do not trust this stranger, you should just sell your maize locally, but if you trust that he will return at least 1500 MWK to you, you should send your bag with him. The activity we are going to do today parallels this kind of decision.
Each activity is played by a pair of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each of you will participate in this activity 8 times, four times as a Player 1 and four times as a Player 2.
You will be Player 1 four times. Each time you are Player 1, you will have a di↵erent partner. In one activity, your partner will be from your own village. In each of the other three times you are Player 1, your partner will be from each of the other three villages. We will tell you which village your partner is from, but we will not tell you which person from that village your partner is. It is important for you to remember that each time you play will be with a di↵erent person from a di↵erent village.
After everyone has been Player 1 four times, you will each have the chance to be Player 2 four times. As Player 2, you will also be paired with four di↵erent people one from each of four di↵erent villages represented here today. Again, we will tell you which village your Player 1 partner is from, but we will not tell you which particular person from each village you will be paired with. Remember that you will never be paired with the same person twice. Thus, you will do this activity 8 times total, always with a di↵erent partner from this room.
Heres how the activity works. Each activity will have two players: Player 1 and Player
2.
When you are Player 1, we will give you 60 MWK for each activity. Player 1 then has the opportunity to send a portion of his 60 MWK to Player 2. He could send 60, or 40, or 20, or nothing. We will triple whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 and then Player 2 has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to Player 1. Then the activity is over.
After every player has decided how much, if any, to put into the four di↵erent envelopes it will be time to be Player 2. Each of you will come into the room one at a time, and you will see how much each of your Player 1 partners sent to you in your envelope, which will then be tripled. For each of the four envelopes sent to you, you will decide how much (if any) of the money in the envelope you want to keep and how much (if any) you want to leave in the envelope to be returned to the person who placed the money there for you.
After every player has decided what to do with the money in the envelopes given to them, we will call you one at a time one last time to open up your original envelopes and see how much, if any, money was returned to you by Player 2. Thus for each time as Player 1, the player will go home with whatever he kept from his original 60 MWK, plus anything returned to him by Player 2. For each time as Player 2, he goes home with whatever was given to him by Player 1 and then tripled by the research team, minus whatever he returned to Player 1. At the very end, you will go home with the amount you earned from four times as Player 1 and four times as Player 2.
Here are some examples.
[Research assistants acted out the following examples. When each hypothetical Player 1 makes their choice, money was put in an envelope. Then, research assistants visually showed Player 2 opening the envelope and visually showed the e↵ect of tripling the money. Then, Player 2 made his decision by putting the returned amount in an envelope. The first two examples were acted out, and then the entire above instructions were given in Chitumbuka, followed by the last two examples.] 1. Imagine that Player 1 gives 60 MWK to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 180 MWK (three times 60 equals 180). At this point, Player 1 has nothing and Player 2 has 180 MWK. Then Player 2 has to decide whether he wishes to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 120 MWK to Player 1. At the end of the activity Player 1 will go home with 120 MWK and Player 2 will go home with 60 MWK.
2. Imagine that Player 1 does not send anything to Player 2. There is nothing for us to triple. Player 2 gets 0 MWK and so cannot return anything. At the end of the activity Player 1 will go home with 60 MWK and Player 2 will go home with nothing. Note that the larger the amount that Player 1 gives to Player 2, the greater the amount that can be earned by the two players combined. However, it is entirely up to Player 2 to decide what he should give back to Player 1. The first player could end up with more than 60 MWK or less than 60 MWK as a result.
Imagine that
We will go through more examples with each of you individually when you come in one at a time. In the meantime, do not talk to anyone about the activity. Even if you are not sure that you understand the activity, do not talk to anyone about it. This is important. If you talk to anyone about the activity while you are waiting to play, we must disqualify you from participating. Now we will call in each person one by one to decide whether or not to send any money to each of your four di↵erent partners, and if so, how much. After all of you have played as Player 1, then each of you will come in a second time to play as Player 2.
Instructions to Player 1 Participant
[Participant is called in using his or her Game Identification Number, which he or she has on piece of paper received upon registration. Informed consent was obtained, and then the Market Survey was administered. After the market survey was completed, the research assistant gave the following instructions in the language of the participant:]
You will now do the activity as Player 1 four times. For each activity, you will have a di↵erent Player 2 partner. In one activity, your Player 2 partner will be from your own village. In each of the other three times you are Player 1, your Player 2 partner will be from each of the other three villages. I will tell you which village your Player 2 partner is from, but we will not tell you which person from that village is your partner. It is important for you to remember that each time you play will be with a di↵erent person from a di↵erent village.
For each activity, I will give you 60 MWK and you can decide how much to send of that 60 MWK to Player 2. You can send 60, or 40, or 20, or nothing. We will triple whatever amount you decide to give to Player 2 before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to you. Then the activity is over.
Let [If the participant answered these questions correctly, the research assistant proceeded to administer the game. If the participant did not understand, the research assistant would explain the game again until the participant was able to correctly answer the questions above.] Now you will play as Player 1 four times, with four di↵erent individuals here today. First, you will play with a person from Village. Here are your 60 MWK.
[At this point 60 MWK were handed to the participant.]
Here is the envelope. Whatever you want to send to this person from Village, you should put in the envelope. Whatever you want to keep, you put in your pocket.
You can send them nothing, 20, 40, or 60 MWK, it's up to you. Player 2 will receive this amount tripled by me. Remember the more you give to Player 2 the greater the amount of money at his or her disposal. While Player 2 is under no obligation to give anything back, we will pass on to you whatever he or she decides to return. I am going to turn my back, and I want you to put whatever money you want to send in the envelope [This was repeated for each of the three other partners from each of three other villages.]
Instructions to Player 2 Participant
Now you are playing as Player 2 four times, with four di↵erent individuals here today. Four di↵erent individuals from four di↵erent villages decided how much money to send to you. Remember, these are not the same individuals you were paired with when you were Player 1.
We will open each of your four envelopes. For each envelope, you will decide how much of the money in the envelope to return to the person that sent that money to you. Remember you can return nothing or keep nothing or anything in between.
Here is the envelope that was sent to you by a person from Village . How much is in it? As you remember, I will now triple the amount sent to you. I will add MWK to make it MWK total. [Research assistant recorded on the envelope how much money it contained. He then added two times that amount in order to produce a total equal to triple the amount sent by Player 1.] I will turn my back while you decide how much of that money you want to keep for yourself, and how much would you like to return to person from Village that sent you that money. Whatever you want to send back, put in the envelope, and put the rest in your pocket.
[This is repeated for each of the three other partners from each of three other villages.]
Instructions to Player 1 Participant in Final Round
Now we are going to open each of the four envelopes you sent to other players when you were Player 1. We are going to see how much they returned of the money that you sent them, and then we tripled.
Here is the first envelope. You sent MWK to your partner from Village. We tripled that amount and made it MWK. How much did your partner return to you? [Research assistant recorded the amount returned on the envelope and the participant put the money in his or her pocket. This was repeated for all four envelopes.]
Appendix D Robustness
Ordered Probit Estimates Model 1 of Table D .1 reports the results of an ordered probit model of the impact of shared nationality and shared ethnicity on trust behavior. This model includes participant random-e↵ects and round fixed-e↵ects. Similar the main results, these models show that participants condition their trust in roughly equal measure on both shared nationality and shared ethnicity. Table D .2 reports the predicted probabilities of entrusting 0, 20, 40, and 60 MWK for each type of partner in the trust game.
Model 2 of Table D .1 reports the results of models estimating the impact of national identification strength, national identity salience, and their interaction on the size of the coethnic trust premium among conationals. The results are qualitatively similar to treating trust as continuous: there is a positive coethnic bias, but this bias is decreased by strong national identification or the presence of a national prime, especially among weak national identifiers. 
Alternative Measures of National Identification
In this appendix, I replicate the main results using two alternative measures of national identification, one based on a factor-based aggregation of the six questions measuring strength of national identification and one based on the standard Afrobarometer measure of national relative to ethnic identification.
PCA Measure of National Identification
For the main analyses, the strength of national identification measure was created for each participant by averaging across agreement with six statements (Table 1 ). In this section, I evaluate the robustness of this measure as a predictor of trust by evaluating a di↵erent aggregation approach. In particular, I utilize an unrotated principal component analysis (PCA). The six items in Table 1 load positively onto the first factor (eigenvalue = 1.4) and this first factor explains a significant component of the total variation (23%). Table D .3 and Figure D .1 present the main results using this first factor (standardized) as the measure of national identification, which produces very similar results to the main specification using the average measure of national identification. Figure D .2 present the main results using the Afrobometer measure of national relative to ethnic identification, and the results are very similar to the main results reported in the paper. In particular, in the absence of the national identity prime, the size of the coethnic trust premium is decreasing with stronger national relative to ethnic identification, with the trust premium eliminated among respondents who identify with their national identity only. For those participants who were exposed to the national identity prime, coethnics and non-coethnics are trusted at the same rate (the coethnic trust premium is not distinguishable from zero) for all levels of national relative to ethnic identification. While the national identity prime treatment e↵ects are not statistically significant for any level of national relative to ethnic identification, the largest treatment e↵ect is estimated for participants who identify with their ethnic identity only (i.e., weak national identifiers). 
